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ecumenical delegation to th e Papal Inaugural Mass . He notes the new Pope's
"openness and understanding of all the problems of married people and the family." He adds a note of confidence : "I feel sure that with him the Church is going
to know a renewal of faith in the openness and fidelity of the great tradition ."
This is a small book physically, but a mighty one, invaluable to all who are
tru ly concerned with the family and with ethical and effective regulation of
births.
- Andre J. de Bethune, Ph.D.
Professor of Chemistry
Boston College

A Private Choice,
Abortion in America in the Seventies
John T. Noonan, Jr.
Free Press, New York, New York, 1979. 224pp., $11.95.
This book not only summarizes the legal history of the entire abortion controversy in America in the seventies, but it also presents the basic evidence one must
consider to take a stand on the whole question. It does this in only 192 pages,
divided into 21 chapters called "Inquiries."
The first five Inquiries discuss the Supreme Court's A bortion Cases. The next
11 give a political and legal history of the abortion controversy, explaining whe re
abortion got its political support, how its proponents and the press masked the
"liberty" of abortion with legend, and how the "liberty" so expanded that its
proponents forced the active cooperation of all in the abortion act. In the last five
Inquiries, Noonan explains e xactly what abortion is - the killing of human
beings - and he proposes a solution that might "limit" the "l iberty" of abortion.
Noonan explains with succinctness why the decision in The Abortion Cases
conflicts with the Constitution. The Constitution insists that certain natural rights
of individuals and families antedate the existence of the state . The state must
recognize these rights, but it cannot create or destroy them, this truth being the
raison d'etre of the Bill of Rights. But in The Abortion Cases, the Supreme Court,
in effect, made every right depend on the state's, or its own, will by arrogating to
itself the power to establ ish who is and who is not a legal person. Though the
Court claimed to abstract from the question of the unborn's personhood, actually
it determined that the unborn were to be treated as nonpersons. If the Court, and
not the natures of things, determines who is and who is not a legal person , then
every right depends on the Court's will. The abortion decision implicitly separates
the whole system of laws and rights from any criterion outside the will of the
rulers.
Justice Blackmun tried to ground the " right of abortion" in a right of privacy ,
claiming such a right of privacy was includ ed in the " li berty " guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment: "Nor shall any State deprive any person of ... liberty .. . withou t due process of law." The key phrase here is "due process of
law." Blackmun m e rely begs the question when he implies that th e state abortion
laws were not "due process." He might as well have said, "This law was not due
process because it 'deprived a liberty without du e process'." For Blackmun's
argument to work, he had to assume that the state could have no "compelling
interest" to limit th e liberty of pregnant women. But for that assumption to
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work, he had to assume that the unborn were not persons, the precise qu estion he
claimed to ignore.
A major point of Noonan's book is that the "liberty" of abortion is intrinsically dynamic. Because the controversy involves the basic concepts of human
nature and human responsib ility, the pro-abortionists want , and in a sense need,
more than official neutrality. They will settle for nothing less than open approval
and universal cooperation.
The mere legality of abortion was therefore not enough. The pro-abortionists
demanded that government finance the exe rcise of this "liberty," even though the
government finances the exerc ise of no other traditional, real liberty , such as of
speech or of religion. Government does not buy printing presses or build churches
for the poor. Supposedly, humanitarian concern for the poor motivated the
demand for funding. Yet no one objected when the same Supreme Court ruled
also that states can refuse welfare assistance to the fifth child of a mother on
welfare: government must finance the poor's "right" to abortion (if pro-abortionists get their way), but not the poor child's right to eat. How "humanitarian" is a
government that says, " We will h elp you, but first let us abort your children"?
The ex pansive tendency of the abortionist movement explains why pro-abortionists sought court orders to force private hospitals to turn over facilit ies for abortions
(p. 84); why a federal court ruled that certain private hospitals receiving federal
money must permit elective abortions (p. 209, n. 14) ; why Harriet Pilpel , Planned
Parenthood's general counselor and ACLU's vice-chairman, argued that doctors
with religious scrupl es about abortion might be practicing "sectarian m e dicine;"
why state colleges have forced students to finance abortion through insurance
funds, and when the students refused, tried to expel them; why medical schools
screened their stude nts accord ing to their beliefs on abortion (p. 84); and this
expansive tendency explains why the Supreme Court assau lted the internal structure of th e family, and ruled that states cannot require parental consent or notification for an abortion on a minor , or consent of the father for an abortion on his
wife (pp. 90-95).
Noonan also explains well the biological facts proving the humanity of the
unborn , and the gruesom e details of abortion operations proving that abortion is
literally the knifing, poisoning or suffocating of the unborn baby .
While his explanation of the problem and his history of how it arose are sound
and to the point , his solution is insufficient. Noonan favors a so-called "States'
Rights" amendment as opposed to a "Mandatory Human Life" amendment. The
diffe rence is that a "States' Rights" amendment would only give states the power
to protect unborn life, but would not require them to do so; a "Mandatory"
amendment would define that the unborn are human persons , and require that the
states give the unborn (as well as the aged) equal protection of homicide statutes.
Noonan has two principle objections to a "Mandatory" amendment. His first is
that it is too difficult to pass. He seems almost hopeless about the task.
But this objection holds only if a "States' Rights" amendment is acceptable to
begin with. And it is not, for the simple reason that it is opposed in principle to
the pro-life cause itself. The whole controversy hangs on whether the government,
fe deral or state can determine by its own will that a class of human beings is not
persons deserving protection of the law. The "States' Rights" amendment would
answer that states can do just that. No matter how it is worded, the "States'
Rights" amendment gives the power o. life and death to the states. It concedes to
the states the power to ignore th'e natural rights of the unborn. The "States'
Rights" amendment would not be a partial victory for the unborn; it would be
their utter defeat.
Th e moral tone of American society is definitely tending toward the acceptance of abortion; we liv e in an anti-baby culture. If a "States ' Rights" amendment
were e nacted, and some states outl a wed a bortion while others permitted it , the
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greater public pressure would be toward relaxing t he surviving abortion statutes.
Legalized abortion, with no chance of another constitutional amendment to stop
it, would be the end result.
Noonan's second objection to a "Mandatory" amendment is that it "would
work a substantial change in duty and power within our federal system of government" (p. 184). The "Mandatory" amendment would give to the federal government basic powers which have traditionally belonged to th'e states. This objection
seems to be the most serious in his own eyes; it is the one most emphasized .
To this I reply that such considerations pale in significance before the question
of whether the government is to kill or not kill human beings. The entire nation
wades in the blood of unborn babies, and Noonan is worried about the "correct"
distribution of governmental power according to the framers' intentions!
Besides, a "Mandatory" amendment would not upset the distribution of governmental power. The amendment would not itself be a criminal statute, but
would enjoin that the protection of existing homicide statutes be applied to the
unborn . This is certainly appropriate to the Constitution.
I cannot help thinking Noonan takes this position partly because he underestimates how serious the situation is. Throughout the book , sometimes by th e
language he chooses, he seems to bend too far in trying to be polite to the
opposition. For exampl e, on p. 161 he claims that while abortion is accurately
called "killing," those who call it "murder" exaggerate its gravity . In the legal
sense, of course, abortion is not murder; but morally, abortion certainly is murder, the direct taking of innocent human life. Noonan's book, as a whole, seems to
treat abortion as only a minor derailment in America 's journey toward manifest
destiny. In truth, America 's destiny may be Auschwitz; America is already there
with abortion, and euthanasia might be next. In this situation extreme politeness
is incongruous; and to be aginst abortion, if not merely " personally, " but still
merely "statewise," is insufficient. Noonan is against abortion. But his strategy is
an unacceptable compromise.
- Patrick Lee
Assistant Professor of Philosophy
St. Francis de Sales College

Catholicism and Modernity
James Hitchcock
Seabury Press, New York, N. Y , 1979.
This scholarl y and perceptive book is perhaps the best of a succession of books
written in an analysis of the great dislocation and loss of identity which have
occurred in the Catholic Church since Vatican II. Although most of the documents of that much discussed council would convey a continuity with the rich
traditions of 2,000 years of Catholic thought, they remain largely unread. The
great post-conciliar upheaval brought what amounted to a giant non-sequitur to
those traditions. The leaders of the ersatz reform claim sanction from Vatican II
but they are guilty of the fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc.
Professor Hitchcock analyzes the e lements of the current crisis with a style that
is both controlled and persuasive, Reform in the Church has meant traditionally
that men would be changed by religion , not religion by men. Following Vatican
II, however, various spokesmen for the Church have declared that the Church's
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